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Introduction	
	
This	chapter	examines	the	changing	nature	of	the	relationship	between	gentrification	and	the	
cultural	 economy	 in	 theory	 and	 practice,	 it	 also	 highlights	 a	 gap	 in	 debates	 about	
gentrification.	Whilst	 the	 role	 of	 culture	 in	 the	 gentrification	 process	 has	 received	much	
attention,	the	cultural	economy	has	not.	The	gap	stems	from	tendencies	to	instrumentalise	
culture,	 to	 reduce	 it	 to	 consumption,	 and	 to	 ignore	 its	 value(s)	 and	 the	 means	 of	 its	
production.	This	chapter	focuses	on	a	complex	and	sometimes	misunderstood	field,	that	of	
cultural	production.	The	paradox	that	we	encounter	is	that	cultural	workers	and	artists	are	
often	portrayed	as	both	the	causes	and	the	victims	of	gentrification.	An	important	step	in	my	
argument	is	to	broaden	and	contextualise	debates	about	gentrification	to	make	sense	of	this	
paradox.	I	will	argue	that	gentrification	–	if	we	take	Ruth	Glass’s	(1964)	classical	definition	of	
the	process	as	displacement	of	former	residential	tenants	–	should	also	be	further	explored	
in	 relation	 to	 movements	 and	 displacements	 between	 manufacturing,	 office,	 retail	 and	
cultural	sites.	Such	changes,	outside	of	residential-residential	moves,	have	been	subject	to	
un-nuanced	analyses	of	social	and	political	agency	in	respect	to	cultural	workers	and	artists.	
On	one	hand,	artists	have	been	portrayed	as	dupes	and	uni-dimensional;	on	the	other	hand,	
the	economic	contribution	of	cultural	(production)	activities	has	been	under-valued	(see	Park	
2016,	d'Ovidio	and	Rodríguez	Morató	2017).	
	
Formerly	 industrialised	 inner	 cities	 of	 North	 America	 and	 Europe	 have	 been	 through	 a	
particularly	intense	pattern	of	social	and	economic	change	over	the	last	50	years.	This	process	
has	 involved	 rebuilding	 and	 transforming	 spaces,	 often	 into	 quite	 different	 uses.	 This	
transformation	 primarily	 has	 not	 involved	 residential	 property	 (although	 there	 have	 been	
transformations	of	residential	spaces	 in	tandem:	 it	 is	 the	 latter	that	has	been	the	focus	of	
much	 of	 the	 gentrification	 literature).	 The	 picture	 has	 been	 of	 old	 manufacturing	
infrastructure	 (factories	 and	 warehouses,	 storage	 and	 related	 transport,	 especially	 port-
related)	being	either	razed	to	the	ground	and	replaced	by	new	buildings,	or	refurbished;	in	
both	cases	the	site	is	converted	into	other	uses:	sometimes	offices,	other	times	residential,	
and	exceptionally	cultural.	
	
The	causes	of	this	transformation	lie	in	the	process	of	de-industrialisation	(of	mainly	North	
American	and	Western	European	cities),	and	the	concomitant	industrialisation	of	East	Asia.	
The	outcomes	 in	each	city	are	different	as	 local	responses	have	been	mobilised;	however,	
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they	are	commonly	bundled	under	the	label	of	the	emergence	of	the	‘post-industrial’	city.	
Gentrifying	cities	in	North	America	and	Western	Europe	experienced,	first	depopulation	and	
then	 re-population	 of	 the	 inner	 city;	 in	 many	 cases,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 balance	 of	
employment	shifted	to	the	service	sector,	in	notable	cases	financial	services.	It	is	important	
to	underline	that	this	 involved	a	double	movement	 in	 labour	markets:	of	former	 industrial	
workers	out,	and	new	service	workers	in:	very	few	workers	made	the	transition	in	person.	
This	had	important	implications	for	housing	stock,	and	housing	demand	(see	Lees,	Slater	and	
Wyly,	2008).		
	
A	less-reported	trend	is	that	concerning	the	cultural	economy;	as	a	productive	sector	it	has	
also	grown	in	relative	and	absolute	importance	in	cities.	Indeed,	many	would	argue	that	the	
growth	of	creative	employment,	and	the	demand	for	creative	employees,	is	a	characteristic	
of	the	post-industrial,	or	knowledge,	economy	(Pratt	2007,	Hutton	2015).	In	addition,	there	
have	been	substantial	shifts	in	the	governance	regimes	of	North	American	and	West	European	
cities	and	nation	states	which	in	general	terms	have	been	characterised	by	a	shrinking	of	the	
state	(that	is	reducing	the	responsibilities	of	the	state	for	collective	guidance	and	provision	of	
goods	 and	 services),	 and	 a	 focus	 on	 importing	 economic	 growth	 activities	 through	
competition.	This	 latter	competitive	practice	ranges	 from	the	attraction	of	companies	and	
sectors	of	 the	economy	that	are	perceived	 to	be	growing,	 to	 the	attraction	of	 tourist	and	
visitor	spending.	To	attract	investment	and	to	compete	with	other	cities,	urban	governments	
have	developed	many	tools	starting	with	subsidies,	and	extending	to	lifestyle	and	branding.	
Culture	 has	 become	 an	 important	 instrument	 in	 the	 city	 booster	 toolkit	 (Palmer-Rae	
Associates	2004,	Florida	2008,	Anholt	2010,	Kong	2012).	
	
The	processes	outlined	above	are	complex	and	manifold,	and	it	is	not	the	intention	to	explore	
them	in	detail	here.	My	point	is	to	underline	the	fact	that	the	Euro-American	inner	city	has	
become	 a	 major	 opportunity	 for	 developers	 to	 exploit	 the	 ‘rent	 gap’	 opened	 up	 in	 the	
redevelopment	process.	Arguably,	economic	restructuring,	especially	globalisation,	provides	
the	most	fertile	ground	for	gambling	on	revaluation	of	land	uses	and	property:	a	foundation	
of	 the	 gentrification	process.	 Following	 from	 this	my	 concerns	 in	 this	 chapter	 are	 first,	 to	
widen	the	focus	from	housing	to	the	economy	more	generally;	and	secondly,	to	argue	that	
culture	(as	heritage,	or	experience;	or,	as	practice)	is	a	common	theme	which	is	generally	in	
the	background.	The	aim	here	is	to	foreground	the	ways	in	which	culture	plays	a	part	in	urban	
transformations.	Finally,	to	highlight	the	neglect,	or/and	the	instrumentalisation	of	culture	in	
the	global	cities	paradigm	(Pratt	2011a),	and	analyses	framed	by	the	concept	of	the	‘creative	
class’(Pratt	2011b);	and	instead	to	encourage	more	attention	to	situated	analyses	in	the	spirit	
of	comparative,	or	planetary,	urbanism.	
	
The	 gentrification	 literature	 has	 already	 begun	 substantive	 debate	 over	 the	 relationship	
between	gentrification	and	globalisation	(Lees	2003;	Atkinson	and	Bridge,	2005;	Butler	and	
Lees	2006;	 Lees,	 Shin	and	Lopez-Morales,	2016),	 in	addition,	 there	has	also	been	a	 long	 -
running	debate	about	the	relationship	between	culture	and	gentrification.	To	embrace	the	
transformations	 wrought	 by	 the	 emergent	 cultural	 economy	 I	 want	 to	 argue	 that	 these	
debates	need	to	be	extended	further.	I	will	re-inforce	a	relatively	neglected	aspect	of	this	new	
trend	to	include	not	just	residential	to	residential	‘upgrading’	(classic	gentrification),	but	also	
including	transitions	such	as	manufacturing	to	residential,	manufacturing	to	cultural	work,	
and	cultural	work	to	residential	uses	(see	Zukin,	Trujillo	et	al.	2009,	Curran	2010,	Yoon	and	
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Currid-Halkett	2014,	Hubbard	2016,	Kim	2016).	Displacement	of	less	powerful	actors	by	more	
powerful	actors	characterises	these	transitions,	moreover	it	presages	a	cultural	change,	not	
simply	one	of	consumption	and	identity	(as	already	discussed	in	the		gentrification	literature),	
but	also	one	of	cultural	production	and	cultural	value(s)	(Jung,	Lee	et	al.	2015,	Grodach,	Foster	
et	al.	2016).	
	
I	want	 to	make	 the	 case	 that	 the	displacement	of	 artistic	 and	 cultural	workers	 is	 not	 the	
‘victimless	crime’	that	it	appears	to	be	presented	as	in	much	urban	regeneration	literature;	it	
has	significant	negative	impacts	on	the	livelihoods	and	economic	output	of	one	of	the	few	
growing	sectors	of	contemporary	economies.	Moreover,	this	continual	displacement	of	artists	
and	cultural	workers	undermines	the	delicate	cultural	ecosystems	that	sustain	such	economic	
and	cultural	output	in	our	cities.		
	
The	chapter	is	divided	into	three	parts.	Part	one,	opens	up	the	debate	about	the	artist	and	
the	city.	The	second	part	reviews	the	urban	regeneration	regimes	that	have	implicated	culture	
and	produced	distinct	cultural	gentrification	effects.	The	third	part,	pulls	the	focus	away	from	
cultural	 consumption	 and	 instrumentalism	 and	 explores	 how	 a	 concern	 for	 cultural	
production	re-configures	that	fate	of	the	cultural	worker	in	the	city.		
	
Part	1:	Artists	and	the	City	
	
In	this	part	I	want	to	introduce	the	subject	‘caught	in	the	middle’:	the	cultural	worker.	I	will	
show	that	we	need	to	understand	the	related,	but	often	dislocated,	flows	of	production	and	
consumption	in	the	city.	I	will	represent	these	through	the	contrast	of	the	figures	of	the	artist	
and	the	hipster.	Second,	I	revisit	a	classic	of	gentrification,	Zukin’s	(1982)	work	on	‘loft	living’	
in	New	York	City,	and	suggest	that	some	further	contemporary	lessons	can	be	learned.	
	
Artists	and	Hipsters	
	
It	is	difficult	to	avoid	debates	about	gentrification	today,	but	they	have	a	different	character	
to	 those	of	 former	years.	 In	addition	 to	 the	working-class	 family	being	 forced	out	of	 their	
property	and	replaced	by	a	middle-class	family,	other	common	characters	include	the	cultural	
worker	 (artist)	 and	 cultural	 consumer	 (Hipster).	An	emblematic	 case	 is	 that	of	 the	 ‘Cereal	
Killer’	shop	in	Brick	Lane,	London	(Khomami	and	Halliday	2015;	see	Figure	1).	This	is	a	store	
selling	boutique	breakfast	cereal	at	vastly	inflated	prices,	which	has	clearly	attracted	a	market	
who	are	willing	to	pay.	However,	Brick	Lane	is	on	the	‘fault	line’	between	the	City	of	London	
and	Tower	Hamlets,	a	predominantly	poor	and	ethically-diverse	community	dominated	by	
social	housing,	it	is	one	of	the	poorest	boroughs	in	the	UK.	The	‘hipster’	shop,	of	which	Cereal	
Killer	is	emblematic,	the	lifestyle	and	cultural	milieu	that	surrounds	it,	has	become	a	notable	
feature	of	many	North	American	and	European	cities	in	recent	years.		
	
A	common	trope	of	inner	urban	cultural	redevelopment	these	days	is	the	Hipster.	It	is	a	term	
widely	and	 loosely	used,	but	refers	to	a	style	and	affectation	of	an	artistic	producer;	 in	 its	
current	 stylistic	 manifestation	 with	 a	 throwback	 to	 a	 Victorian	 fashion	 sensibility;	 it	 is	 a	
subculture	 that	 has	 powerful	 consumption	 effects.	 The	 Hipster	 is	 a	 dedicated	 cultural	
consumer	who	puts	‘taste’	at	the	top	of	the	agenda.	Associated	with	this	trend	is	the	extreme	
consumption	choices	offered	for	products	such	as	coffee	or	beer:	the	craft	beer	scene	being	
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one	example.	It	 is	clearly	a	complicated	phenomenon,	but	what	unites	it	 is	that	it	requires	
considerable	 disposable	 income	 to	maintain	 the	 lifestyle	which	 is,	 like	most	 sub-cultures,	
manifest	by	conspicuous	consumption.	Despite	 its	affectation	of	 ‘craft’	and	‘making’	 it	 is	a	
form	and	practice	of	consumption.	As	will	be	noted	later,	what	Richard	Florida	(Florida	2002)	
refers	 to	 as	 the	 Creative	 Class,	 or	 David	 Brooks	 (Brooks	 2000)	 refers	 to	 as	 Bourgeois	
Bohemians,	overlaps	with	the	Hipster;	the	common	feature	being	a	focus	on	(a	variety)	of	
cultural	consumptions,	and	the	purchasing	power	to	attract	suppliers.	
	
It	 is	not	 surprising	 that	 ‘Cereal	Killer’	became	a	 flash-point	 in	demonstrations	about	 rising	
property	prices	 (not	 just	 residential	prices),	 and	 the	displacement	of	people	and	activities	
from	traditional	neighbourhoods.	A	similar	manifestation	of	‘hipster’	consumer	outlets	can	
be	 found	 in	many	property	 ‘hot	 spots’	 in	 London,	 and	across	 the	world.	 Indeed,	 they	are	
perceived	 by	 property	 professionals,	 or	 even	 praised,	 as	 an	 index	 of	 an	 area	 ‘coming	 up’	
(being	gentrified).	The	transformation	offered	by	developers	is	derelict	industrial	land	sites	
made	 over	 into	 luxury	 condominiums.	 The	 shock	 is	 not	 simply	 of	 cultural	 and	 economic	
transformation,	but	also	the	physical	scale.	As	an	example,	the	development	of	Bishopsgate	
Goods	Yard,	which	is	part	of	the	back	story	of	the	‘Cereal	Killer’	demonstrations,	is	planned	
to	be	one	of	the	tallest	in	London.	So,	the	point	is	that	residential	and	commercial	property	
transformation	 is	 closely	 linked	 with	 cultural	 consumption	 (see	 the	 recent	 work	 on	
touristification	discussed	in	Lees,	Shin	and	Lopez-Morales,	2016;	and	retail	gentrification	and	
hipsters	in	(Zukin,	Trujillo	et	al.	2009,	Hubbard	2016)).	
	
But,	there	is	another	side	to	the	story.	Brick	Lane	has	been	an	emblematic	epicentre	of	the	
growth	of	cultural	and	artistic	workers	in	East	London;	it	is	not	a	consumption	sub-culture	but	
a	 ‘scene’	 (Straw	2001),	a	 community	of	artistic	practice	 (Mar	and	Anderson	2010).	 For	25	
years,	artists	have	moved	to	the	cheaper	property	of	the	East	End	(deserting	West	and	Central	
London)	(Green	1999).	Initially	they	used	short	let	housing	as	live-work	spaces,	these	have	
been	supplemented	by	‘art	factories’,	 larger	industrial	spaces	converted	into	artist	studios.	
The	Truman	Brewery	Site,	on	Brick	Lane,	is	an	exemplar	(Oakley	and	Pratt	2010).	As	the	name	
suggests	this	was	a	redundant	brewery	that	was	converted	into	cultural	studio	spaces.	Other	
models	 of	 space	 provision	 are	 also	 found,	 from	 the	 not-for-profit,	 artist-owned,	 studio	
providers	 such	 as	 (in	 London)	 Acme	 and	 Space,	 to	 the	 short-life	 housing	 owned	 by	 local	
authorities.	What	unites	these	property	forms	 is	 that	they	are	vehicles	to	 insulate	tenants	
(artists)	from	property	price	inflation,	a	form	of	social	rent	control.	More	successful	artists-	
those	with	a	global	audience	–also	have	studios	near	Brick	Lane,	but	they	have	been	able	to	
own	them	in	their	own	right	(for	example	Tracey	Emin,	and	Gilbert	and	George).	What	has	
been	referred	to	as	the	greatest	concentration	of	artists	 in	Europe,	has	been	facilitated	by	
forms	of	studio	provision	that	have	been	devised	in	opposition	to	upgrading/gentrification.	
However,	it	is	not	a	form	that	is	secure,	nor	guaranteed.	We	will	revisit	this	in	Part	3.	
	
The	phenomenon	is	not	confined	to	London,	a	notable	example	is	the	article	that	David	Byrne	
(2013)	 (curator	 and	 formerly	 in	 the	 band	 Talking	 Heads)	 wrote	 about	 New	 York	 City,	
bemoaning	the	fact	that	artists	could	no	longer	afford	to	have	studio	space,	let	alone	live,	in	
the	inner	city.	This	is	especially	poignant	as	New	York	(see	below),	especially	the	area	around	
SoHo,	was	in	effect	given	a	new	life	when	artists	moved	in	in	the	1970s.	The	very	notion	of	
the	‘loft’	as	an	artistic	space	was	coined	here.		
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We	can	add	yet	another	layer	of	significance	here,	that	cities	such	as	London	and	New	York	
now	promote	themselves	as	desirable	locations	for	tourism	and	living,	as	well	as	for	work,	on	
the	basis	of	 the	presence	of	 this	cultural	buzz	 (Mayor	of	London	2012).	For	 the	most	part	
artists	are	instumentalised	as	creators	of	a	playground	for	Hipsters,	BoBo’s	and	the	Creative	
Class:	what	City	Mayor’s	 now	 consider	 as	 a	 necessary	bauble	 to	 attract	 the	 latest	 hi-tech	
producer	to	the	city.	At	the	same	time,	this	creates	the	conditions	to	precisely	undermine	the	
possibility	 of	 creative	 producers	 to	 remain	 in	 the	 city.	 This	 has	 been	 an	 ongoing,	 and	
naturalised,	 aspect	 of	 urban	 regeneration.	 The	 economic	 (as	 opposed	 to	 the	 cultural	 and	
social)	dimensions	of	 the	cultural	and	creative	 industries	have	become	more	 important	 in	
cities	in	the	last	decade.	In	London,	for	example	by	2010,	they	counted	as	the	fourth	largest	
employment	sector	(Freeman	2010).	
	
Thus,	it	is	very	clear	that	the	artist	and	cultural	worker	is	being	displaced	from	the	inner	city.	
The	dominant	policy	and	political	discourse	is	that	artists	can	simply	move	on	and	regenerate	
another	 neighbourhood;	 in	 fact,	 it	 is	wonderful	 and	necessary	 that	 they	 should	 (see	 Park	
2016).	This	process	can	be	characterised	as	a	viscous	cycle	of	artistic	gentrification.	One	would	
expect	 that	 artists	 would	 be	 cherished	 given	 their	 seemingly	 ‘Midas	 touch’	 to	 property	
markets;	 far	 from	 it	 they	would	 perhaps	 be	 better	 characterised	 as	 ‘cannon	 fodder’.	 The	
economic	role	of	the	cultural	and	creative	industries	has	until	recently	been	overlooked	at	
both	national	and	urban	scales	(Buitrago	Restrepo	and	Duque	Márquez	2013,	NESTA	2013).	
The	well-known	artist,	Grayson	Perry	(2014),	has	a	4-part	cartoon	illustrating	this	process	in	
his	book	“Playing	to	the	gallery”.	Image	1	shows	a	decaying	factory	building,	possibly	squatted	
by	artists;	image	2	has	the	building	now	renamed	‘old	industry	studios’,	it	is	clearly	managed	
studio	space;	in	image	3	the	building	has	another	makeover,	this	time	it	is	labelled	a	‘creativity	
hub’	 fronted	 by	 a	 trendy	 café,	 and	 is	 obviously	 a	 fancy	 co-working	 space	 for	 new	media	
workers.	 The	 coup-de-grace	 is	 image	4,	 the	building	has	been	 torn	down	and	 rebuilt	 in	 a	
modern	style	and	is	called	‘Bohemia	apartments’	(see	Figure	2).	This	process,	and	its	ever-
decreasing	time-scale,	presents	major	challenges	for	the	creative,	and	urban,	economy.	
	
Before	beginning	to	reconnect	the	opposing	aspects	of	production	and	consumption,	culture	
and	economy,	we	need	to	understand	how	we	have	framed	the	debate	thus,	this	requires	us	
to	revisit	debates	about	the	global	city	and	culture.	In	the	following	part	of	the	chapter	I	will	
review	the	policy	and	practices	that	flow	from	normative	misconceptions.	In	part	3	they	are	
reconnected.	
	
The	global	city	
	
	
Debates	rooted	in	the	Global	City	paradigm	as	exemplified	by	Sassen	(2001)	characterise	a	
massive	 transformation	 of	 world	 urbanism	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 ‘super-league’	 of	
‘command	and	control	centres’	of	the	global	economy-	the	Global	City-	rooted	in	the	power	
of	the	financial	services.	Sassen	and	Castells	 (1989)	have	pointed	to	the	emergence	of	the	
dual,	or	polarised,	city	as	a	result:	between	rich	and	poor,	between	those	linked	to	a	 local	
economic	system,	or	a	global	one.	
	
In	 a	 series	 of	 papers	 Loretta	 Lees	 (Lees	 2003;	 Butler	 and	 Lees	 2006)	 and	 colleagues	have	
developed	an	argument	for	the	emergence	of	super-gentrification	in	some	cities	associated	
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with	the	huge	sums	paid	to	workers	in	the	financial	services	sector.	This	is	an	argument	that	
has	a	correspondence	with	the	social	polarisation	thesis	of	those	writing	about	the	Global	
City.	The	elite	gentrification	of	older	and	established	housing	stock	 is	beyond	the	reach	of	
even	the	locally	‘very	well	off’;	other	manifestations	of	this	emergence	of	a	super	elite	have	
been	 plotted	 across	 many	 global	 cities,	 especially	 associated	 with	 either	 elite	 gated	
communities	 and	 buildings,	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 massive	 basements	 to	 existing	 large	
properties.	Some	displacement	is	going	on	here,	but	between	the	rich	and	the	super-rich.	
	
A	key	weakness	of	the	Global	Cities	paradigm	literature	has	been	its	understanding	of	culture.	
King	and	others	have	stressed	the	importance	of	colonialism,	and	cultural	diasporas;	but	this	
has	tended	to	be	swept	up	as	a	part	of	a	debate	about	labour	markets	and	migration.	A	similar	
economic	reductivism	applies	to	the	cultural	economy	which	is	generally	characterised	as	a	
dependent	‘service’	of	the	core	economy,	having	little	if	any	autonomous	significance,	and	
none	in	respect	to	the	economic	realm	(Pratt	2011b).	In	part	this	deficit	is	a	function	of	history,	
the	 cultural	 economy	was	 not	 significant	 in	 cities	 25	 year	 ago,	 although	 it	 is	 now.	 Today,	
rightly,	we	can	question	just	how	‘dependent’	the	cultural	economy	is,	and	if	it	is	emerging	as	
a	driver	in	its	own	right.	I	will	argue	that	the	gentrification	literature	suffers	from	a	similar	
problem.	
	
I	want	to	direct	us	back	to	an	earlier	manifestation	of	what	might	be	called	gentrification	in	
an	earlier	period.	 I	want	to	highlight	the	lens	through	which	it	was	viewed.	Sharon	Zukin’s	
(1982)	seminal	work	on	‘loft	living’	has	always	had	an	uneasy	relationship	both	with	the	global	
cities	 paradigm	 and	 the	 gentrification	 literature.	 The	 properties	 that	 she	 examined	 were	
previously	industrial	spaces.	Zukin’s	work	offered	a	particular	insight	into	what	would	later	be	
called,	after	Bourdieu	(1979)	‘habitus’.	Zukin	was	writing	before	the	translation	of	Bourdieu,	
and	working	more	closely	to	a	tradition	of	structural	Marxism.	Zukin’s	work	on	Loft	Living	was	
notable	for	many	reasons,	here	I	want	to	point	to	the	methodological	import	of	recovering	
culture	 from	 the	 economic,	 an	 insight	 which	 can	 help	with	 contemporary	 debates	 about	
gentrification	 and	 culture.	Her	 focus	 on	 ‘gentrification’	 concerned	 the	 cultural	mores	 and	
aspirations	as	expressed	through	proximity	and	decoration	of	the	converted	lofts	she	found	
in	lower	Manhattan.	Of	course,	a	parallel	concern	was	a	focus	which	has	been	codified	as	a	
second	iteration	of	the	gentrification	literature,	the	embrace	of	culture	(Lees,	Slater	and	Wyly,	
2008);	Zukin	did	this	avant	 la	 letter	but	 in	a	way	that	was	different	 from	how	culture	was	
subsequently	framed	in	the	gentrification	literature	(see	Lees,	1994,	on	Zukin	in	the	economic	
versus	culture	debate).	
	
The	standard	reading	of	Zukin’s	work	stresses	cultural	differentiation,	and	glosses	over	the	
fact	that	this	was	a	form	of	economic	revaluing	(a	rent	gap	existed	for	sure),	and	that	the	
displacement	was	of	manufacturing	and	warehousing	activity;	an	activity	 that	had	already	
left:	the	buildings	were	empty.	Readings	of	Zukin’s	work	are	often	shorn	of	a	sense	of	place	
and	time,	and	context.	We	noted	above	in	David	Byrne’s	cri	de	coeur	that	the	artists	were	
being	moved	out	of	their	lofts;	by	just	the	people	that	Zukin	was	writing	about,	and	those	that	
followed.	The	pioneers	of	the	‘downtown	scene’	in	what	became	SoHo	(before	it	became	a	
by-word	for	high	–end	consumption)	were	a	group	of	artists	that	valued	the	cheap	rents	that	
allowed	expansive	studio	space	for	‘space	hungry’	art	forms:	abstract	art,	dance,	music	and	
everything	in	between.	Perhaps	the	best	known,	Andy	Warhol	-	had	his	studio	space	which	
he	called	‘The	Factory’	(Pratt	2012),	creating	a	resonance	through	every	such	conversion	to	
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today.	 From	 artists	 such	 as	 Pollock	 to	 Anderson,	 to	Maattu-Clark,	 Tharpp	 and	 Glass,	 and	
eventually	 to	Byrne,	 the	 studio	 space	was	 a	 breeding	 ground	 for	 new	art	 forms	 (Yi	 2011;	
(Miller	2016)).	
	
The	use	of	the	term	‘loft’	was/is	not	original	to	these	factory	buildings;	but	is	a	nod	to	the	
original	mid-19th	century	Parisian	Latin	Quarter,	popularised	by	Puccini	 in	La	Boheme;	the	
loft	or	garret	room	was	the	cheap	space	at	the	top	of	a	multi-dwelling	house	occupied	by	
artists.	Of	course,	this	was	the	early	usage	of	the	term	‘Bohemian’	(to	designate	a	style	of	
living,	and	consumption)	as	well	(Lloyd	2006).	The	gallery	scene	of	SoHo	in	the	1970s,	and	its	
demi-secret,	was	part	and	parcel	of	the	attraction	for	Zukin’s	loft	dwellers.	The	irony	is	that	
the	loft	dwellers	in	New	York	City	that	Zukin	wrote	about	were	doing	it	on	the	cheap	(they	
were	not	super-gentrifiers),	indeed	New	York	City	was	bankrupt	and	property	was	cheap.	
	
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 Neil	 Smith	 (Smith	 1987,	 Smith	 1996)	 was	 writing	 about	
gentrification,	 from	a	Marxist	point	of	view,	at	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 the	 same	city,	narrating	
events	 a	 few	 blocks	 east.	 Smith’s	 story	 was	 of	 the	 classic	 economic	 cycle	 of	 decline,	
refurbishment	and	revaluing	in	the	residential	areas	of	Alphabet	City.	The	point	to	be	made	
is	the	development	of	particular	analytical	lenses.	Whilst	acknowledging	the	role	of	the	state,	
Smith’s	 interpretation	 put	 economics	 first,	 and	 characterised	 culture	 as	 dependent.	 Later	
interpretations	sought	to	re-balance	this.	What	got	lost	in	the	narrative	were	the	artists,	the	
very	 embodiment	 of	 the	 delicate	 relationship	 between	 the	 economic	 and	 the	 cultural.	 It	
became	a	neat	fit	to	view	artists	as	another	class	of	the	displaced.	
	
Whilst	the	loft-dwellers	moved	uptown,	or	to	Brooklyn,	the	artists	moved	on	too,	as	a	later	
paper	of	 Zukin’s	 (Zukin	 and	Braslow	2011)	 elaborates.	However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 a	
further	step	many	of	these	converted	warehouse	spaces	progressed	through,	many	(in	San	
Francisco	and	London,	as	well	as	New	York)	became	the	site	of	new	media	companies	(Pratt	
2000,	Jarvis	and	Pratt	2006,	Pratt	2009),	only	later	to	become	found	residential	conversions.	
This	serial	displacement	has	significant	impacts	for	the	changing	mix	of	creative	industries,	as	
well	as	their	eventual	eviction	altogether.	The	history	of	Hoxton	Square	(half	a	mile	north	of	
Brick	Lane)	provides	a	neat	empirical	chronology	–	as	we	saw	illustrated	by	Perry	previously	-	
of	residential	decline	and	vacancy,	to	artist	studios,	to	new	media	offices,	to	night-clubs	and	
restaurants,	and	finally	to	high-end	residential.	In	the	London	case	the	life	cycle	shortened	
from	that	of	New	York’s	25	years,	to	less	than	15	years.	
	
These	cases	illustrate	the	importance	of	examining	the	serial	and	progressive	displacement	
of	different	users	(within	a	use	class).	In	this	case,	the	change	in	of	economic	character	in	the	
locale.	This	process	challenges	the	employment	and	the	economic	basis	of	the	city.	As	noted	
above,	the	economic	contribution	of	the	new	cultural	economy	to	cities	has	changed	in	recent	
years.	It	is	this	new	tension,	and	its	economic	implications	that	the	over	emphasis	on	both	
‘cultural’	and	the	relative	neglect	of	displacement	of	economic	uses	by	high	end	residential	
developments,	 that	needs	more	attention	 (for	 indicative	studies	see	Curran	2004,	Hutton,	
Catungal	et	al.	2009,	Curran	2010,	Yoon	and	Currid-Halkett	2014).	
	
The	normative	view	is	to	naturalise	this	process	as	one	of	growth	and	succession,	and	the	
attitudes	that	have	been	prevalent	support	this,	namely	that	artists	are	expendable,	or	that	
new	 media	 workers,	 or	 artists,	 will	 move	 on	 and	 find	 another	 cheap	 space.	 A	 Marxian	
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interpretation	might	 simply	be	 that	 the	 artists	were	used	and	exploited	 in	 the	process	of	
revaluing.		However,	there	is	nothing	natural	or	inevitable	about	it.	On	one	hand,	as	we	know	
from	‘rent	gap’	theory	there	is	the	economic	opportunity	created	by	property	speculation.	On	
the	other	hand,	there	are	individuals	looking	for	environments	in	which	to	experiment	and	
innovate.	 It	seems	remarkable	in	moral	terms,	but	also	economic	terms,	that	the	latter	be	
quashed	by	the	former.	Would	we	apply	such	a	logic	to	the	financial	services	industries?	Quite	
the	opposite,	in	the	case	of	financial	services	cities	fall	over	themselves	to	provide	subsidised	
office	 buildings	 and	 residential	 accommodation,	 and	 even	 to	 the	 extent	 of	 creating	 new	
transport	 infrastructure.	 It	 is	 the	 argument	 of	 this	 chapter	 that	 this	 point	 of	 view	 needs	
revisiting.	However,	before	doing	that	I	want	to	plot	out	the	fate	of	culture	and	the	cultural	
economy	in	the	post-industrial	city.	
	
Part	2:	Culture	and	the	Post-Industrial	City	
	
Global	city	formation	has	clearly	intensified	and	projected	gentrification	studies	into	a	new	
space;	but	as	we	have	seen	it	also	marks	the	re-entry	of	debates	about	artists	and	cultural	
workers.	Despite	the	shifting	theoretical	focus	from	the	systematic	and	universal	global	city	
paradigm	to	a	more	contextual	approach	(variously	described	as	comparative,	or	planetary,	
urbanisation)	 a	 continuing	 question	 concerns	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	 cultural	 and	 the	
economic.		Despite	Zukin’s	(1982)	inclusion	of	culture	in	a	Marxist	framework	and	Lees	(1994)	
and	 Clark’s	 (1994)	 wish	 to	 broach	 the	 economic-culture	 divide	 in	 gentrification	 studies,	
debates	are	still,	more	often	than	not,	presented	as	separate	issues,	or	focused	on	the	role	of	
cultural	makers	in	gentrification.	In	this	section,	we	interpret	a	shift	in	the	linkage	of	culture	
and	the	city,	one	that	has	some	(mostly	unacknowledged)	impacts	on	cultural	workers;	the	
impacts	are	manifest	as	displacement.	I	present	three	variants	of	linking	culture	and	the	city	
under	 conditions	 of	 port-industrial	 redevelopment:	 design-led	 development,	 cultural	
branding,	and	 instrumental	 remediation.	They	are	all	characterised	by	state-led	 initiatives,	
and	 the	 subordinate	 position	 of	 culture	 in	 relation	 to	 large	 scale	 infrastructure	 projects;	
showing	 how	 culture	 is	 viewed	 as	 instrumental	 in	 ‘re-valuing’	 land,	 and	 in	 generating	
consumption.	
	
A	perspective	that	I	want	to	explore	next	concerns	what	is	–	for	the	most	part	–	a	state-	led	
response	to	de-industrialisation:	urban	regeneration.	The	ravages	of	de-industrialisation	and	
the	decaying	hearts	of	Euro-American	cities	were	clearly	a	barrier	 to	new	development.	 If	
cities	were	to	attract	new	people	(to	pay	taxes	and	finance	the	city),	new	homes	and	jobs	
would	have	to	be	found;	and	moreover,	appropriate	buildings	constructed	to	accommodate	
different	economic	activities.	The	old	infrastructure	was	decayed	and	in	disrepair,	but	it	was	
also	not	suitable	for	modern	uses.	For	the	most	part	the	city	was	given	a	boost	of	regeneration	
by	state	led	investment	in	mega-projects,	culture	played	and	plays	a	subservient	role	in	these	
plans.	
	
Design-led	development	
	
A	notable	feature	of	this	redevelopment	is	the	large-scale	challenge	of	creative	public	space	
and	public	uses	as	well.	The	challenge	was	clear	to	all;	this	was	not	simple	‘in-fill’	development	
but	whole-scale	rebuilding.	A	theme	that	emerged	was	for	cities	to	redevelop	extensive	land-
uses	such	as	port	areas.	A	cultural	shift	was	required	that	sought	to	celebrate	 ‘waterfront	
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development’,	for	housing	and	retail,	and	sometimes	offices.	Due	to	the	history	of	most	rivers	
and	ports	 in	cities,	development	had	 literally	 ‘turned	 its	back’	on	 the	waterways	 (Brownill	
2013).	Any	number	of	schemes	sought	to	regenerate	port	facilities	this	way;	and	to	develop	
riverside	activities	in	the	urban	centre	(Jones	1998).		
	
The	model	of	the	entertainment	or	cultural	anchor	tenant	for	urban	redevelopment	has	been	
a	common	one	explored	in	the	US	to	repopulate	the	inner	city,	a	strategy	referred	to	as	the	
‘urban	entertainment	machine’	(Lloyd	and	Clark	2001).	This	governance	concept	references	
the	notion	of	the	(mainly	retail	and	hotel)	‘growth	machines’	of	many	US	cities	whereby	retail	
and	 entertainment	 capital	 dominate	 urban	 regeneration	 programmes	 (Molotch	 1976).	 In	
many	 cases	 this	 economic	 control	was	 supported	 by	 social	 control	where	 police	 adopted	
aggressive	positions	with	respect	to	behaviour	that	disrupted	the	‘clean’	city	image	(Parenti	
2000).	 Most	 clearly,	 action	 targeted	 the	 homeless,	 but	 it	 also	 impacted	 on	 other	 non-
normative	street	practices.		
	
The	 irony	 is	 that	 ‘cleaning	 the	 streets’	 created	 a	 bland	 and	 ‘culture-less’	 space.	 This	was	
experienced	most	notably	in	massive	urban	regeneration	projects	such	as	that	of	London’s	
Docklands.	 The	 short-term	 benefits	 to	 developers	 were	 seldom	moderated	 by	 long	 term	
responsibility	for	city	building;	simply,	as	in	cases	such	as	London,	developers	were	given	a	
free	hand	to	develop	buildings,	but	with	no	social	responsibility	for	community,	housing	or	
public	 space.	 It	 took	 nearly	 20	 years	 for	 Canary	Wharf	 to	 develop	 the	 aspects	 of	 urban	
conviviality	that	one	might	expect	of	a	city.	The	grandiose	nature	of	these	developments	and	
the	 master-planning	 style	 adopted	 neglected	 the	 social	 and	 the	 cultural;	 a	 point	 latterly	
acknowledged	 in	a	 significant	UK	 report	 (Rogers	1999)	 that	highlighted	 the	 importance	of	
mixed	uses,	and	of	a	social	agora,	for	good	city	planning	and	design	(Imrie	and	Raco	2003).	
Not	surprisingly,	many	precarious	tenants	of	abandoned	port	facilities	were	artists,	clinging	
onto	gaps	in	the	real	estate	market;	they	had	to	move	on.	It	 is	notable	that	the	‘needs’	of	
artists	 and	 cultural	 workers	 were	 simply	 not	 part	 of	 the	 agenda	 in	 this	 phase	 of	 urban	
regeneration.	
	
Cultural	Branding	
	
Culture,	 but	 not	 artists,	 did	 become	 a	 focus	 of	 regeneration	 in	 a	 different	 style	 of	
redevelopment.	 This	 was	 driven	 by	 an	 instrumentalism	 of	 competition	 between	 cities,	
whereby	high-profile	public	buildings,	usually	contemporary	art	galleries,	are	used	to	‘pimp’	
a	city’s	image.	The	classic	example	is	the	Guggenheim	in	Bilbao;	striking	architecture	is	used	
to	 create	 global	 visibility	 and	 to	 act	 as	 an	 anchor	 tenant	 for	 a	 redevelopment	 project.	
Moreover,	contemporary	art	has	a	symbolic	power	projecting	an	old	deindustrialised	city	to	
appear	forward	and	culturally	engaged.	The	strategy	is	based	on	place-branding,	underpinned	
by	 the	notion	 that	 in	 an	 increasingly	homogenous	global	 landscape	differentiation	 can	be	
achieved	by	culture	(Evans	2003).	Contemporary	art	is	a	particularly	useful	platform	as	it	is	
new,	and	still	being	made,	in	contrast	with	Classical	art	(and	the	galleries,	and	cities,	which	
these	new	cities	seek	to	compete	with).		
	
There	 has	 been	 much	 debate	 about	 the	 success	 and	 failures	 of	 hard	 branding,	 and	 the	
Guggenheim	model	(Plaza	2000);	however,	the	position	of	local	artists	and	creative	workers	
is	not	part	of	this	debate.	On	the	one	hand,	there	are	many	examples	of	artist	communities	
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and	studios	that	were	destroyed	as	part	of	such	gallery	redevelopment;	on	the	other	hand,	
the	high-end	apartments	that	accompany	projects	such	as	the	Tate	Modern	exacerbate	an	
already	starkly	polarised	housing	market	(Dean	et	al,	2010).	Either	way,	there	is	no	space	for	
artists.	Along	the	lines	of	the	‘urban	entertainment	machine’,	the	audience	are	tourists	and	
consumers,	 the	city	benefits	 from	the	number	of	bed-nights,	and	other	generated	 income	
from	visitors.		
	
The	singular	project,	usually	a	contemporary	art	gallery,	is	one	variant	of	city	banding;	another	
is	a	more	extensive	approach	pioneered	by	cities	such	as	Glasgow.	The	European	Capital	of	
Culture	was	 a	 project	 devised	 to	 circulate	 Europe	 to	 celebrate	 the	 cultural	 diversity,	 and	
history	 of	 the	 continent.	 Glasgow’s	 contribution	 was	 to	 mobilise	 the	 designation	 to	 an	
extensive	set	of	projects	based	on	a	re-branding	of	Glasgow,	and	an	association	of	Glasgow	
with	 culture.	 Due	 to	 the	 perceived	 success	 of	 the	Glasgow	 event,	 similar	 objectives	 have	
underpinned	 other	 candidate	 city	 strategies	 since	 (Palmer-Rae	 Associates	 2004,	 Garcia,	
Melville	et	al.	2010,	Lähdesmäki	2012).	However,	despite	the	more	strategic	perspective,	and	
the	 more	 variegated	 art	 forms,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 stronger	 focus	 on	 participation,	 the	 more	
integrative	Glasgow	model	still	viewed	culture	as	consumption,	and	not	production(Garcia	
2005).	
	
Instrumental	remediation	
	
A	third	variant	of	culture-city	relationships	in	post-industrial	regeneration	concerns	what	are	
best	referred	to	as	mega-projects.	Of	course,	the	European	Capital	of	Culture	is	a	contender	
here;	I	want	to	differentiate	the	Glasgow	case	from	some	of	the	examples	that	followed	based	
on	a	critical	 factor:	 land	remediation.	So	 far,	 the	examples	 that	have	been	discussed	have	
predominantly	 concerned	conversions,	 and	 rebuilding,	 and	new	developments	on	existing	
sites.	For	urban	redevelopment,	these	are	the	‘low	hanging	fruit’,	the	real	problem	concerns	
redeveloping	 sites	 on	polluted	 land.	 The	 key	 point	 here	 is	 that	 the	 land	 value	 is	 in	 effect	
negative	(due	to	the	upfront	investment	in	‘cleaning’	the	site	before	any	development	can	
take	place)	(Syms	1994).	Culture	has	been	part	of	an	instrumental	package	to	‘unlock’	this	
land	(often	located	close	to	the	city	centre).		
	
A	classic	example	was	that	of	the	Millennium	Dome	in	London.	The	initial	plan	was	that	public	
remediation	would	be	paid	for	by	the	‘celebratory’	experience	of	the	Dome	(which	was	to	be	
temporary),	which	would	act	as	a	marketing	tent	(literally,	as	it	was	a	tent)	for	the	site,	the	
same	model	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 underpin	 the	 Liverpool	Garden	 Festival	 (Pratt	 2010).	 Despite	
substantial	 criticisms	 of	 the	 perceived	 value	 for	 money	 (to	 the	 public	 purse)	 of	 such	
developments	the	model	was	used	to	create	the	London	Olympic	Park,	the	site	of	the	2012	
Olympics.	A	temporary	cultural	event	is	a	staging	post	for	polluted	land	to	be	remediated,	and	
then	sold	on	to	the	market.	The	place	for	culture	and	the	event	is	temporary,	based	solely	on	
short	term	consumption.		
	
As	will	 now	be	 a	 familiar	 story,	 the	 London	Olympic	 site	 development	 created	 significant	
displacement	of	a	community	of	cultural	producers	(a	few	of	whom	are	still	hanging	on	in	the	
Hackney	Wick	cultural	quarter).	Whilst,	Hackney	Wick	is	now	seen	as	London’s	next	cultural	
growth	 zone,	 it	 was	 not	 part	 of	 the	 original	 plan.	 That	 original	 plan	 did	 have	 a	 cultural	
economy	focus;	the	Olympic	media	complex	was	to	be	redeveloped	as	London’s	new	media	
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quarter	(Foord	2013).	However,	the	idea	to	relocate	what	is	known	as	‘Silicon	Roundabout’	
the	new	media	community	that	had	grown	up	around	Hoxton	and	Old	Street	proved	to	be	a	
non-starter	(Nathan,	Vandore	et	al.	2012).	
	
	So,	 to	add	 further	 irony	 the	London	Olympic	site	plan	did	 include	a	 focus	on	the	creative	
economy,	however	in	making	the	plan	cultural	workers	were	displaced	and	destabilised,	and	
a	temporary	cultural	project	was	mounted.	The	new	development	was	proposed	based	on	
relocating	creatives	from	one	part	of	London	to	another.	These	projects	are	misguided	due	to	
a	‘blindness’	to	the	operation	of	the	creative	economy.	Developers	and	planners	do	not	see	
already	 existing	 cultural	 activity	 (or	 they	 do	 not	 value	 it).	 Moreover,	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	
appreciation	of	the	extent	to	which	cultural	activities	are	embedded	in	a	social,	economic	and	
cultural	 ecosystem	 that	 forms	 a	 co-dependent	 environment	 (Martins	 2015).	 Constant	
relocation	imperils	such	communities	of	practice;	as	well	as	ignoring	the	cultural	embedding	
of	creative	activities	in	the	city	itself.	It	is	to	these	issues	that	we	turn	in	Part	3	of	the	chapter.	
Before	that	we	can	to	explore	the	high-point	of	the	culture-city	(consumption)	relationship:	
the	creative	class	and	the	city.	
	
This	section	has	dwelt	on	UK	examples	for	a	reason;	they	have	commonly	been	taken	as	‘best	
practice’	 for	policy	makers	worldwide.	Clearly,	on	one	hand	this	 is	part	and	parcel	of	neo-
liberal	evangelism	exemplified	by	‘fast	policy’	(Peck	and	Theodore	2015);	on	the	other	hand,	
policy	making	underpinned	by	a	global	city	paradigm	that	is	insensitive	to	local	cultures	and	
institutions	(Pratt	2009).	The	following	approach,	based	upon	Florida’s	creative	class	thesis	
combines	the	worst	of	both	approaches.	
	
The	Creative	class	and	the	City	
	
The	debate,	and	policy	movement,	inspired	by	Florida’s	(2002)	‘rise	of	the	creative	class’	has	
become	identified	with	the	notion	of	the	‘creative	city’.	Arguably,	this	is	the	worst	iteration	
yet	of	the	relationship	between	culture	and	the	city	for	creative	workers.	Florida’s	argument	
boils	down	to	the	attraction	of	foreign	direct	investment	to	cities.	The	assumption	being	that	
if	capital	is	mobile,	then	the	unique	selling	point	of	a	location	will	secure	the	investment,	and	
hence	jobs.	Cities	have	long	engaged	in	this	process;	their	tools	were	first	lowering	costs:	rent	
free	periods,	subsidized	land,	holding	local	wages	down.	In	the	era	of	globalisation,	the	multi-
plant	 enterprise	 faced	 a	 problem	 of	 moving	 experienced	 staff	 around	 the	 world,	 and	
overcoming	resistance	from	staff	and	their	families	on	relocation.	City	Mayors	realised	that	if	
they	 sold	 their	 cities	 as	 attractive	 to	managers	 responsible	 for	 re-location	 decisions,	 they	
might	win	 the	 game	 through	a	 ‘soft	 power’	 of	welcoming	 green	and	 clean	environments,	
augmented	by	high	culture	and	heritage	attractions.		
	
Florida’s	 insight	 was	 taken	 from	 Daniel	 Bell’s	 notion	 of	 the	 growth	 of	 a	 post-industrial	
economy	(Bell	1973),	recognising	that	in	the	new	economy	the	‘talent’	was	what	mattered	to	
companies.	Florida	developed	this	argument,	suggesting	the	existence	of	a	 ‘creative	class’,	
who	 are	 attracted	 to	 liberal,	 and	 contemporary	 cultural	 environments.	 Florida’s	 key	
intervention	was	to	suggest	that	the	creative	class	were	the	critical	human	capital	that	would	
attract	hi-tech,	high	growth	companies	(reversing	the	traditional	idea	that	labour	would	move	
to	employers).	Thus,	by	modelling	themselves	as	a	cultural	class	playground,	workers	would	
gravitate	to	cities,	and	then	companies	would	seek	them	out,	and	want	to	be	located	there.	
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Such	an	argument	plays	to	the	eternal	weaknesses	of	politicians	of	self-promotion	and	short	
term	popularity,	and	a	veneer	of	academic	respectability.	
	
There	are	two	significant	issues	with	the	‘Creative	City’	argument.	First,	that	the	creative	class	
identified	 by	 Florida,	 are	 the	 workers	 of	 hi-tech,	 not	 the	 cultural	 industries;	 in	 fact,	 the	
argument	 is	 one	 about	 the	 consumption	 power	 of	 the	 creative	 class.	 The	 culture	 is	
instrumental,	to	provide	a	‘funky	environment’.	Second,	the	consequence	that	cities	should	
privilege	the	creative	class.	That	a	city	could	decide	that	the	creative	class	(already	a	privileged	
group)	should	be	first	in	the	queue	for	resource	and	support	is	challenging.	Moreover,	that	
the	city	should	make	its	infrastructure	and	services	over	to	please	this	group	sets	some	clear	
priorities.	The	knock-on	effects	are	plain	and	apparent,	that	gentrification	is	legitimised	and	
promoted	as	the	motor	process	of	urban	regeneration,	and	that	the	distributional	balance	of	
resource	is	skewed	to	the	least	needy,	and	to	a	sectional	taste.	The	paradox,	or	rather	stark	
contradiction	is	of	a	city,	promoting	itself	as	‘creative’	whilst	at	the	same	time	limiting	access	
to	 culture,	 focusing	 on	 consumption,	 and	 not	 simply	 neglecting	 but	 actively	 undermining	
cultural	 production	 through	 a	 super-fuelled	 gentrification	 of	 commercial	 and	 residential	
properties	 (Pratt	 2011a).	 Clear	 examples	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 forces	 that	 are	 unleashed	 and	
legitimised	by	 such	 support	 for	a	 creative	class	 strategy	are	evidenced	 in	many	cities,	but	
particularly	 starkly	 in	 San	 Francisco	 (Jarvis	 and	 Pratt	 2006),	 Vancouver	 (Hutton	 2008),	
Shenzhen(O’Connor	and	Liu	2014),	and	Lees,	Shin	and	Lopez-Morales,	 (2016),	on	 ‘creative	
cities’	in	the	global	south).	
	
Part	3:	Finding	a	place	for	cultural	production	in	the	city	
	
It	will	be	clear	 that	 the	extant	models	of	 culture	and	 the	city	do	not	have	a	place	 for	 the	
creative	worker.	 The	 site	 is	 occupied	by	 creative	 consumption,	one	where	 culture	 is	 used	
instrumentally	 to	achieve	a	 short	 term	economic	benefit.	 In	 the	meantime,	 it	will	actually	
displace	and	undermine	cultural	producers.	Artists	and	cultural	workers	have	been	caught	in	
a	 perfect	 storm	of	 contradictions	where	 they	 are	 noticed,	 but	 ignored;	wanted,	 but	 then	
disposed	of.	The	problem,	is	twofold.	First,	that	empirically	the	cultural	economy	has	grown	
in	many	cities	(and	in	the	global	economy),	it	challenges	‘traditional’	industries	in	terms	of	its	
economic	strength,	it	carries	additional	cultural	power	as	well.	Second,	and	perhaps	related	
to	the	first,	our	conceptual	lenses	need	refocusing	on	culture	and	the	cultural	economy,	not	
viewing	them	as	dependent,	or	expendable,	but	as	integral	to	the	urban	process.	In	this	final	
part	 of	 the	 chapter	 I	will	 outline	why	 and	how	 the	 creative	 economy,	 artists	 and	 cultural	
workers	may	be	recognised	as	a	central	part	of	urban	change.	
	
Alternatives	for	culture	and	the	city	
	
The	need	for	creative	cities,	and	creativity,	is	a	common	refrain	from	politicians.	However,	in	
practice	 what	 has	 been	 delivered	 either	 through	 policy,	 or	 simply	 urban	 redevelopment	
practices,	undermines	the	possibility	of	a	vibrant	cultural	and	creative	community.	In	part,	as	
I	have	argued,	this	is	because	culture	and	creativity	have	been	primarily	conceived	of	through	
the	lens	of	consumption,	from	museum	and	gallery	visits	to	bars,	restaurants	and	nightclubs.	
Culture	 is	seen	as	a	way	to	burnish	the	city’s	 image.	None	more	so	than	 in	the	age	of	the	
Creative	 City	 where	 the	 edgy-contemporary	 arts	 consumerism	 is	 one	 more	 necessary	
environmental	must	have	to	attract	hi-tech	investors	in	search	of	creative	class	knowledge	
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workers.	In	this	normality	it	is	regarded	as	fine	for	artists	to	be	regularly	uprooted	from	their	
studios	and	pushed	further	out	of	the	city.	In	fact,	artists	are	now	put	in	the	(unwilling	and	
unasked	for	role)	of	the	‘shock	troops’	of	gentrification:	troops	that	will	be	the	first	to	suffer	
as	economic	growth	in	a	community	takes	off.	In	short	the	gentrification	of	artists	has	been	
normalised	(Park	2016).	
	
However,	at	the	same	time	the	value	of	urban	cultural	production	has	been	transformed	from	
that	 of	 primarily	 heritage	 and	 provision	 of	 consumption	 experiences	 to	 one	 of	 cultural	
production	 that	 produces	 both	 substantial	 economic	 and	 cultural	 value.	 The	 growth	 of	
cultural	production	has	taken	place	despite	the	conditions.	The	normal	pattern	has	been	for	
artists	to	fight	a	running	battle	to	simply	hold	their	place	in	the	city.	Artists	have	been	subject	
to	the	same,	some	might	say	more	exaggerated,	form	of	the	rent	gap	as	industrial	properties	
have	been	re-developed	and	re-valued.	To	some	extent,	commentators	have	been	blind	to	
the	experiences	of	artists	as	they	occupied	industrial	spaces.	
	
The	strategies	that	artists	have	used	to	‘cling	on’	has	been	via	collective	‘self-provisioning’.	A	
popular	model	to	step	off	the	rent	gap	escalator	has	been	to	remove	the	property	from	the	
market,	to	buy	it;	then	to	provide	rent	control	for	artists.	These	collectives,	found	in	many	
cities	are	predominantly	run	by	and	for	artists.	However,	recent	studies	have	highlighted	the	
complex	 and	nuanced	 responses	of	 artists	 (Grodach,	 Foster	 et	 al.	 2016,	Borén	and	Young	
2017);	rather	than	being	the	unwitting	cause	or	dupes	of	community	erosion,	artists	may	be	
at	the	forefront	of	community	action	(Gainza	2016).	Other	critics	have	pointed	to	the	narrow	
social	representation	of	artists	and	their	role	in	the	reproduction	of	male	heteronormativity	
in	 ‘community’	 development	 (McLean	 2014).	 This	 range	 of	 perspectives	 underlines	 the	
inadequacy	of,	and	the	unitary	and	universal	notions	sustained	 in,	 the	 ‘creative	class’	as	a	
concept.	Moreover,	that	the	notion	of	the	creative	class	is	not	a	foundation	for	understanding	
the	creative	city	in	practice.	
	
Artists	 have	 not	 been	 given	 respect	 as	 citizens,	 not	 only	 have	 they	 suffered	 the	 usual	
challenges	of	displacement	due	to	rental	increases	and	redevelopment,	but	they	have	been	
used,	consciously	or	not,	 to	popularise	run-down	areas.	Policy-makers	and	politicians,	and	
many	in	the	local	community,	and	artists,	seem	to	accept	that	this	is	‘how	it	is’.	
	
Little	attention	has	been	paid	until	recently	to	artistic	activity,	how	it	is	organised,	and	the	
importance	of	its	social,	economic	and	cultural	embedding	(Pratt,	2017).	Understanding	this,	
and	responding	to	it,	would	be	a	normal	response	to	other	sectors	of	economic	development	
in	 a	 city.	However,	 such	 a	 realisation	 has	 been	 slow	 to	 dawn	with	 regard	 to	 the	 creative	
economy.	Not-for-profit	provision	of	studio	space	insulated	from	extreme	rent	reviews	is	one	
thing,	however,	there	are	other	lessons	to	learn	from	these	‘creative	hubs’,	or	‘art	factories’	
(Pratt,	 Dovey	 et	 al.	 2016).	 Closer	 inspection	 reveals	 that	 they	 are	 not	 simply	 flexible	 co-
working	spaces,	nor	simply	cheap.	Instead	their	defining	characteristic	is	the	provision	of	a	
community	of	practice	(Wenger	1998)	associated	with	art	forms,	and	commonly	a	support	
infrastructure	of	service	provision	(Virani	and	Pratt	2016).	The	latter	is	particularly	important	
as	most	artists	work	individually,	or	in	small	groups,	and	the	economics	of	service	provision	
works	against	them.	A	variant	of	collective	services	that	are	often	provided	include	training	
courses,	business	advice,	and	access	to	professional	networks,	and	experience.	This	folds	back	
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into	the	former	point,	participation	in	a	community	of	practice	where	skills	and	experience	
can	be	exchanged	and	discussed.	
	
It	is	this	realisation,	that	cultural	work	is	a	viable	option	in	today’s	urban	economy,	that	has	
latterly	prompted	city	authorities	to	learn	from,	and	acknowledge,	what	third	sector	agencies	
have	been	doing.	This	has	required	a	conceptual	shift	away	from	the	dependency	of	culture,	
and	an	exclusive	focus	on	consumption.	It	is	nothing	short	of	recasting	a	‘new	normal’	for	the	
city,	one	that	includes	cultural	production	as	well	as	cultural	consumption.	
	
Conclusion	
	
Arts	and	culture	have	a	precarious	position	in	the	city.	Until	recently	it	is	true	to	say	that	the	
artist	was	likely	to	be	a	victim	of	gentrification.	Confusingly,	cultural	consumers	–	the	creative	
class,	 hipsters	 –	 have	 been	mistaken	 for	 artists	 and	 cultural	 producers,	 creating	 a	 bizarre	
perspective	of	the	artist	being	both	perpetrator	and	victim	of	gentrification.	Whilst	Zukin’s	
work	 alerted	 us	 to	 the	 cultural	 dimensions	 of	 gentrification	 the	 dominant	 focus	 in	
gentrification	writings	has	concerned	the	implications	for	consumption	and	representation	in	
relation	to	retailing,	residential	and	regeneration	projects	more	generally.	This	chapter	has	
sought	to	bring	equal	attention	to	the	relationship	with	cultural	production.	Recent	studies	
reveal	a	complex	and	nuanced	position	of	the	creative	economy	in	urbanisation;	the	change	
of	emphasis	to	comparative	and	planetary	urbanism	has	led	to	a	welcome	attention	being	
paid	to	the	situated	nature	of	development.	In	turn,	this	has	also	undermined	the	notion	of	
creative	class	as	a	valid,	unified,	or	universal	agent	in	contemporary	urbanisation.	
	
From	a	normative	perspective,	the	artist	is	overlooked,	and	only	manages	to	make	a	living	at	
the	margins	–	an	ever-shifting	margin	in	short	life	housing,	and	poorly	maintained	industrial	
buildings.	 The	 post-industrial	 city	with	 its	 large-scale	 redevelopment	 of	 space,	 and	 of	 the	
working	population,	literally	did	not	see	a	place	for	creative	labour.	As	the	cultural	economy	
has	grown	–	in	cities,	and	across	the	world	–	this	image	of	the	artist	and	cultural	worker	has	
been	challenged;	it	also	challenges	our	conceptions	of	the	position	of	the	artist	in	the	city.	
There	 is	 a	 dawning	 realisation	 that	 the	 cultural	 economy	 matters,	 and	 that	 artists	 and	
creatives	need	to	have	a	place	found	for	them	in	the	‘new	normal’	city.	
	
Instead	of	being	forced	to	be	nomadic	and	precarious,	some	policy	makers	are	realising	the	
value	of	 the	artistic	 and	 cultural	 economy	being	 stabilised.	Property	provision	models	 are	
being	devised	 that	give	dignity	 to	artists	and	do	not	 see	 them	as	ways	of	 simply	boosting	
residential	prices.	More	sophisticated	understandings	of	how	the	cultural	economy	works,	
and	what	cultural	practice	and	organisation	looks	like,	and	what	its	strengths	and	weakness	
might	 be	 are	 changing	 the	 ways	 that	 city	 authorities	 regard	 culture.	 The	 short-term	 and	
instrumental	uses	are	not	going	to	disappear	overnight,	but	they	are	part	of	a	change	which	
could	see	an	accommodation	of	the	city	to	the	artist.	However,	this	viewpoint	is	still	a	minority	
perspective.	
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	we	need	 to	 find	a	place	 for	 artists	 in	 the	 literature	and	debates	 about	
gentrification.	For	too	long	they	have	been	marginalised,	or	excluded.	Recent	developments	
are	a	stimulus	to	reconceptualise	and	refine	our	 insights.	Can	 industrial	and	economic	use	
changes	be	considered	as	gentrification,	or	must	the	term	only	apply	in	the	case	of	residential	
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to	residential	changes?	I	would	argue	that	it	can	and	should;	in	fact,	the	complex	and	multiple	
switching	between	building	uses	requires	us	to	do	so.	So,	this	is	perhaps	a	unique	sub-class	of	
gentrification,	but	one	that	is	subject	to	similar	processes.	Moreover,	discussion	of	artists	and	
cultural	 practice	 should	 also	 challenge	 us	 to	 think	 about	 what	 role	 ‘culture’	 plays	 in	 this	
picture.	 Analyses	 of	 cultural	 production	 have	 begun	 to	 challenge	 simple	 production	
/consumption	 binaries,	 culture	 –	 economy	 tensions,	 as	well	 as	 culture	 as	 practice	 versus	
cultural	as	 category.	These	are	conceptual	as	well	 as	practical	 issues	 that	 face	both	 those	
concerned	with	gentrification	and	those	concerned	with	cultural	economy.	
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